This paper empirically examines the determinants of child health in developing countries and how public policy may interact with these determinants. It improves on previous empirical studies by conducting a more careful analysis of the determinants controlling for possible endogeneity, and by using a more comprehensive and richer panel dataset, drawing on a health database covering 136 countries over 1960-2005, supplemented by the latest World Development Indicators data set as well as data on a broad variety of alternative indicators of governance, such as those from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) and the Open Budget Index (OBI). We find that both public spending on health care and the quality of governance matter for the reduction of child mortality rates. However, our mixed results on the interaction of governance with public spending throw some doubt on the conclusiveness of previous empirical studies. 
Introduction
Public spending could help boost human development outcomes directly through, for example, investments in basic education and health. Alternatively, public spending could also be utilized to help strengthen growth-and income-enhancing investments, notably for the vast majority of poor households in developing countries. Both strategies could be principally motivated to address market failures, to the extent that investments in education and health could produce broader externalities for families, communities and the broader economy. Yet governance failures are also possible when it comes to public spending. In an era of tighter public sector resources and many competing areas for public spending and investments, policymakers need to demonstrate strong results from public social spending, which usually requires good governance of public resources.
The importance of good governance has been emphasized by economists and policy analysts, mainly for its role in enhancing economic performance and supporting income growth (for instance, see Hall and Jones 1999) . In line with this idea, some studies in the development literature have highlighted the impact of governance quality on the social outcomes that public policies are supposed to attain, such as education and child health (Pritchett 1996 , Filmer et al 2000 . One idea shared by these studies is that in countries where governance is poor, public resources suffer from leakages and fail to translate into social investments that could result in desirable social outcomes such as better child education and health.
However, much of the development literature on the role of governance has been based on anecdotal evidence, with only a small group of studies that provide empirical evidence on the effect of governance on social outcomes and the effectiveness of public spending. A cross-country study by Gupta et al (2002) suggests that public spending on health care only has an insignificant effect on child mortality rates, whereas corruption itself has a significant negative impact. Along similar lines, a more recent study by Rajkumar and Swaroop (2008) finds that governance quality affects the impact of public health spending on policy outcomes such as child education and health. Their results suggest that in countries that are poorly governed, public spending has little impact on the outcomes; by contrast, in countries with good governance, public spending on health care has a significant effect on child education and child mortality rates.
Our present empirical analysis contributes to this small but growing strand of literature on the role of good governance in enhancing social outcomes, using a comprehensive cross-country dataset on infant and child mortality rates, public spending on health care, indicators of governance quality and other factors that may affect child health. In this paper, we study the impact of public spending on health care on child mortality rates, and how governance affects the effectiveness of public spending. We attempt to improve on previous studies by using better measures of governance quality, and addressing potential reverse causality between public spending on health care and child health outcomes. To our knowledge, many empirical studies of child health determinants do not attempt to address endogeneity issues, with a few exceptions (for example, Rajkumar and Swaroop 2008) which may have relied on a problematic empirical strategy. In our view, the abovementioned authors fail to justify all their explanatory variables. For instance, the authors have used the percentage of population under the age of five as a determinant of child mortality rate in their regression. This demographical variable may be endogenous, because it relates to the fertility choice made according to the contemporaneous mortality rates. The study has also included Muslim religion as a right-hand-side variable without explaining why.
In the present analysis, we contribute to the literature by instrumenting for the potentially endogenous public spending variable, utilizing variation across countries and over time, and using only those explanatory variables that could be justified by the theory. Unlike previous empirical studies that fail to find a meaningful effect of public spending alone on policy outcomes (Gupta et al 2002 on child health, Filmer and Pritchett 1999 on child education and health, Rajkumar and Swaroop 2008 on child education), our study does show that more public spending on health care leads to significantly lower infant and child mortality rates, controlling for governance quality.
Our main regression results indicate that for one percentage point increase in public spending on health care as share of GDP, there may be 0.1 percent decrease in child deaths per thousand children under the age of five. This impact of spending on outcomes is statistically significant at the 1% level.
In the meantime, we also find that the general quality of governance, as measured by the control of corruption and the quality of bureaucracy, plays an important role in helping to reduce infant and child mortality rates. For example, our main regression results lead us to believe that infant and child mortality rates could be significantly lowered if there were less corruption. Likewise, the effect of higher quality of bureaucracy on child mortality rates is also statistically significant.
The impact of a related but more specific aspect of good governance, the transparency of fiscal budgeting process has been covered by the development literature (World Bank 2003 , Ablo and Reinikka 1998 , Deles et al 2009 . The key hypothesis is that the quality of budget institutions affects whether public resources are effectively spent and has an important impact on social outcomes. In the present study, we make an effort to empirically test that proposition by using an institutional quality indicator that directly measures the transparency of the budgeting process. Unlike previous studies of social budgeting that are based on anecdotal evidence, our empirical analysis is less clear about the impact of budget transparency on child mortality rates or the effectiveness of public spending. Data on this new indicator of budget governance is still less than comprehensive, with the transparency ratings available for one year only, so improvements could be made given more informative measures of fiscal transparency.
Apart from variables related to governance quality, we also look into other empirical determinants such as income, inequality and female education. Not surprisingly, we find income per capita to have a significant negative impact on infant and child mortality rates and income inequality to have an adverse effect on child health, implying that access to basic resources by the poor households does matter for child wellbeing.
In order to address endogeneity issues related to maternal choices that are made according to contemporaneous infant or child mortality rates, we use the lag of female illiteracy rate as an explanatory variable. We find a significant positive association between female illiteracy and child mortality rates. Our results provide evidence that child mortality rate, measured as the number of deaths per thousand children under the age of five, may drop more than 1% if there is one percentage point reduction in female illiteracy rate. This finding is consistent with the previous literature on the importance of maternal education for child health (Caldwell 1982; Hojman 1996; Boyle et al 2006; McCrary et al 2011) .
Further, to check robustness of our results to various selection of countries of study, we have conducted our regression analysis using data on a subset of our countries only (non-OECD countries), and obtained similar results. In order to control for unobserved heterogeneity across countries, we have implemented the analysis using country fixed effects. Results are broadly consistent with our baseline.
In summary, after a thorough examination of empirical determinants of child and infant mortality rates, our paper find evidence that apart from standard determinants covered by the child health and the development literature, governance quality in general, as measured by the quality of bureaucracy and the control of corruption, also plays an important role in enhancing child welfare. However, we obtain ambiguous results on the effect of budget transparency and the interaction between governance and public spending effectiveness, which suggests a need to keep searching for more precise measures of governance quality and better instruments for the public spending variable.
The remaining sections of our paper are organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the main determinants of child mortality rates and presents the empirical methodology. We discuss our results in Section 3. Section 4 presents our conclusion.
II. Empirical Methodology
Drawing on the empirical literature, the following summarizes the main explanatory variables that we will use to analyze child health outcomes:
• Income. National income may affect infant and child mortality both directly and indirectly (Hojman 1998) . First, there is a direct positive association between wealth and survival chances, since the ability of households to secure food supply and meet medical needs depends on their wealth level. Second, national income may also affect survival chances indirectly through its impact upon the birth rate. Third, a higher income is usually associated with a higher degree of female participation in the labour force (Handwerker 1992 ), which in turn may have an indirect effect on child mortality rates.
• Inequality. A society's income distribution pattern may affect mortality rates. Waldmann (1992) , for instance, finds that inequality still has an adverse impact on mortality even if the real income of the poor is accounted for. In addition, Agha (2000) documents the rural-urban disparity in child health outcomes due to income inequality in Pakistan. Furthermore, Cornia and others (2008) propose that given an average GDP per capita, a more egalitarian income distribution can improve health status by ensuring that most households have access to basic resources whereas high inequality adversely affect future health status.
• Economic and Income Volatility. Aggregate macroeconomic shocks may have an adverse effect on child health outcomes. If shocks reduce investment in child health, there may be a persistent negative impact on poor children and intergenerational transmission of poverty. On some fronts, such as in education and child labor, the relationship between macroeconomic uncertainty and child outcomes may be ambiguous due to the interplay between substitution and income effects (Ferreira and Schady, 2009) . Thus it remains an empirical question whether the volatility of the macroeconomic environment has a negative or positive impact on child health status.
• Female Education. Education for women can help mothers improve child health through providing more effective child care at home and more efficient use of health services. It may also lead to delayed child bearing and longer birth intervals as well as more work opportunities for women to generate additional household wealth. Wealth in the hands of women is also often seen as more conducive to investing in the basic needs of the household, including on children's health (e.g. Caldwell, 1979; 1986; 1994; Boyle and others, 2006; Hojman, 1998; Basu and Stephenson, 2005) .
• Public Spending on Health. Public health policy and investments can help to reduce child mortality by augmenting households' capability to invest in mothers' and children's nutrition, health and wellbeing. Nevertheless, as elaborated earlier, policies and expenditures do not always translate to these outcomes, and their effectiveness is subject to empirical inquiry.
• Effectiveness of Governance. Public expenditure on health care may not necessarily translate into effective health services due to several reasons. First, the mere allocation of public resources for health services may fail to reach health service providers if budget institutions, which involve budget formulation, execution, monitoring and auditing, do not function properly (Deles, Mendoza and Vergara, 2009 ). Second, even if the health service providers receive the allocated public resources, they may fail to supply effective services to consumers, especially poor people and children due to moral hazard problems and information asymmetry between public health regulators and service providers (World Bank 2004) . Third, intra-household resource allocation may also distort the child health outcomes (Duflo, 2000) . Finally, countries with poor quality of institutions and high corruption tend to invest more in physical capital instead of social welfare (Kaufmann et al, 2004 , Gupta et al, 2002 . Therefore, drawing on the preceding, the empirical model of child mortality rate determinants could be specified by the following equation:
The under-five mortality rate (U5MR) is defined as the probability of a child born in a specific year or period dying before reaching the age of five, if subject to agespecific mortality rates of that period. GDPpc is income per capita measured in 2005 PPP international dollars, PSH is the public spending on health care as a share of GDP, and GOV is a measure of government effectiveness, which is a proxy for the effectiveness of the public sector. X contains other country characteristics that can affect health status, such as illiteracy rate among females and volatility of the macroeconomic environment.
The i-t th observation refers to that of country i, year t. We control for unobserved country-specific characteristics that may affect mortality rates using country fixed effect, so that the intercept for country i is u i. For now we assume that all explanatory variables are exogenous and are not systematically correlated with the error term t i, ε . GOV*PSH captures the interaction between governance effectiveness and public expenditure on health care. The idea is that given a level of public spending on health, a more efficient government can translate the expenditure on health into effective resource allocations for the front-line health care providers so that households could receive more health care services. In our analysis we attempt to obtain insights from the use of various proxies for governance effectiveness, such as the Worldwide Governance Indicators by Kaufmann and others (2009) It is worth noting that there are some possible caveats as pointed out by Rodrik (2005) , who warns that cross-country regressions can often be misleading due to econometric problems such as parameter heterogeneity, omitted variables, measurement errors and especially endogeneity. Since policy interventions are not random and they can be chosen in response to the unobserved country characteristics, cross-country regression analysis of the impact of public policy may be problematic. Therefore, we address the abovementioned econometric issues by tapping a usefully extensive and rich dataset.
First, we make an effort to improve on previous studies by using cross-country panel data covering as long a period as possible, so that it is possible to capture more variation across time and account for heterogeneity across countries by using country fixed effects.
Second, we aim to enhance the empirical specification of the economic determinants of child health outcomes by using better explanatory variables such as more informative proxies for governance quality and better instruments for public spending on health care.
Third, we attempt to address the reverse causality problem associated with the policy variable, namely, public spending on health care. If the public spending on health care is chosen in response to child health outcomes, then it is systematically correlated with the error term in equations (1) and (2) and our estimates will be biased. Thus ideally we need to find an instrumental variable that explains the variation in public spending on health, yet does not determine child health status through any other channels apart from its interaction with public spending.
We propose a plausible candidate instrumental variable: the legal origin of a given country. Previous studies suggest that legal origin may have influence over the tendency of a government to play a more significant role in the society (La Prota et al 1999 , Acemoglu and Johnson 2003 . Legal origins have also been used as instrumental variables for public spending in the previous studies (for instance, see Rajkumar and Swaroop 2008) . The idea is that countries with certain legal origins are more likely to have centralized government control and therefore tend to have greater power in allocating public resources. For instance, countries with a common law system are less state-oriented than those with a civil law system, which are in turn less state-oriented than the ex-Soviet countries. In our paper, we use five legal origin indicators: UK law, French law, socialist law, German law and Scandinavian law. We believe that it is reasonable to assume such legal origins do not directly determine child or infant mortality rates.
We also consider the following variable as potential candidate instrumental variables for public spending on health care:
• Democracy. The structure of the political system may also affect public spending on health care. There is empirical evidence on the positive impact of democracy on public expenditure (Stasavage 2005; Chen 2008; Careja and Emmenegger 2009 ). The idea is that with the introduction of multiple competitions, governments are faced with electoral pressure and thus have a better incentive to increase public expenditure in sectors such as health and education.
In our analysis, the proxy for the extent of democracy is the democratic accountability index from the International Country Risk Guide (Political Risk Group 2009). The measurement of this variable is based on the actual political structure in a given country. For example, a de-facto one-party state is distinguished from a de jure one-party state. We believe that this democracy index is a valid instrument for the spending variable since it is plausible to assume that democracy does not affect child health outcomes directly other than through the public spending channel.
III. Analysis of Empirical Results
The key empirical results for child and infant mortality rates appear in Table 3 through Table 5 . Pooled OLS results show up in Table 3 . In Table 4 , we use country fixed effects to control for unobserved country characteristics that are time-invariant.
Legal origin variables are used as instrumental variables for public spending on health care in the specification used to generate Table 5 . Then we examine the robustness of our results using alternative governance indicators. Results appear in Table 6 . We explore the nonlinearity in the relationship between public spending and child health outcomes in Table 7 . Finally, in Table 8 , we report results using government stability and democracy indicators as instruments for public spending, respectively.
One result that is consistent across all our specifications is that income per capita has a significant effect on child and infant mortality rates, which is not surprising. Better economic performance is associated with better access to health services and thus leads to lower mortality rates. In our baseline results we find that for each percent increase in GDP per capita as measured in PPP terms, there may be about 0.4 percent reduction in child and infant mortality rates.
We now turn to another important determinant of child health outcome: female education. Across all models, we find that the improvement in women's literacy may lead to significantly lower child and infant mortality rates, even though the magnitude of this effect is small: for each percent reduction in female illiteracy rate, there may be more than 0.01 percent decrease in child and infant mortality rates.
Our results also show that public spending on health care does matter. For instance, in our baseline model in Table 3 , we estimate that each percentage increase in public spending as share of GDP is associated with as much as 0.07 percent reduction in child mortality rate (in terms of net effect). However, results on the interaction between public spending and governance quality are insignificant with the unexpected sign, which throws doubts on the finding in the previous literature (Rajkumar and Swaroop 2008 ) that the interaction term has a significant impact on child mortality rates.
Turning to the estimated effect of governance quality, our baseline results are consistent with our expectation: we find that better control of corruption may lead to significantly lower child and infant mortality rates (Columns 3 and 4 in Table 3 ). There is also evidence on the effect of bureaucratic quality, but it is not statistically significant in the infant mortality rate regression in Column 2 in Table 3 .
It is worth noting that our OLS results provide support to the theory that more severe inequality may lead to worse social outcomes. Indeed, we find that one unit increase in the gini coefficient is associated with 0.02 increase in child and infant mortality rates. However, this result does not hold in our fixed effect specification in Table 4 . One possible explanation is that there is insufficient variation within country groups across time. Note that the estimated effect of inequality is extremely small in the fixed effect results.
Interestingly, our IV results in Table 5 are broadly consistent with our baseline results. Note that the estimated effect of public spending is larger in magnitude than that in OLS results, which is consistent with what we expect. Considering the possible reverse causality between public spending and child outcomes, the OLS estimates should be biased towards zero. Results on the other determinants are also consistent with our baseline results. The lack of statistical significance may be due to the fact that there is only limited variation in legal origins and that the correlation between the instrumental variables and public spending is not sufficiently strong.
As a robustness exercise, we have repeated the empirical exercise using a broad set of alternative governance indicators. Results appear in Table 6 . We find that income per capita, inequality, and female education are robust determinants of child mortality rates. Public spending on health care also seems to have a significant impact across most of our specifications. Governance also matters according to our results using ICRG governance indicators of bureaucracy quality and control of corruption. The measurement of governance using World Governance Indicators and Open Budget Index seem to be less precise as the results show that governance only has an insignificant impact on the outcomes. Finally, we also explore possible nonlinear relationship between public spending on health care and the outcomes. Results appear in Table 7 . We note that the estimated impact of public spending is negative and significant whereas the estimated effect of the square of public spending is positive. We conjecture that a nonlinear relationship may exist such that the slope of the impact of public spending may gradually diminish as the government spends more public resources. In that case, there may be an optimal level of public spending on health care.
IV. Conclusion
This paper examines the empirical determinants of child health, by revisiting the links across public spending, governance and child mortality rates. We use comprehensive data on public spending and child health, and various indicators of governance. Our main contribution to the empirical literature lies in our use of various indicators of governance, such as the Open Budget Index (OBI) data which is used as a proxy for budget transparency, and the use of plausible instruments to address the endogeneity of public spending on health care. Using a variety of specifications, the empirical analysis in this paper yields broadly consistent results on public spending and the quality of governance, which imply that both the level of public social spending and the quality of governance matter for child health outcomes. However, we obtain counterintuitive results on the interaction between the two. This in turn raises some questions about how precise the measures of the spending and governance are.
It is worth noting that previous studies have either ignored the endogeneity issues (e.g. Rajkumar and Swaroop 2008 using percentage of population under the age of five as an explanatory variable for child mortality, and the other problematic variables such as the Muslim religion indicator as a determinant without justification) or relied on a small cross-section of observations (e.g. Filmer and Pritchett 1999) . We suggest that future research try to more directly address the links across public spending, governance and child health using alternative data and approaches. We see three promising areas for further work.
First, we recognize the limitations of broad governance indicators. It is possible to improve on measures of governance, by focusing on specific aspects of the governance.
For instance, in the context of the present analysis, governance indicators related to better public finance management might provide the most direct link between public spending and health outcomes. In addition, it might help to examine the same questions addressed in this paper, by using sub-national indicators of governance. In a growing number of countries, public service delivery has become highly decentralized, emphasizing the role of local government units. It is possible that the link between public spending and health is broken at points along the health production chain that are more related to local government public finance. Indeed, we are trying to extend the present study in this direction. Finally, it would be ideal to use household survey data to address the questions in this paper in a complementary way. One possible approach, for example, is to try and evaluate the impact of interventions that create space for public debate of government spending. For instance, it helps to look into the impact of social accountability and citizen participation in cases of sharp increases in the budgets of democratic village governments on the quality of public goods. It would also be interesting to see whether more citizen participation leads to stronger human development and child health outcomes. Such micro-level empirical analysis of effects of governance could complement studies based on aggregate indicators. 
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Globalization-Health Nexus Database (GHND)
The GHND dataset provides comprehensive statistical information required for the analysis of the relationships among country characteristics, globalization and health. It Due to data limitations, our main analysis is based on a subset of this dataset, including observations on 53 countries that cover the period from 1990 to 2000. Among these countries, 32.1% are high-income countries, 37.7% are middle-income countries, 22.6% are low-income countries, the rest 7.6% are transition countries. This subsample contains full information on the following variables, which are relevant for our crosscountry study of the empirical determinants of health outcomes.
Under-five Mortality Rate (per thousand live births). The under-five mortality rate is measured by the number of children who die before the age five per thousand children.
The data on this variable is provided by UNICEF (2006) and the coverage is complete for 1980, 1990, 1995, 2000 and 2005 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) Variables
The International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) rating is based upon three categories of risk: political, financial and economic. A separate index is constructed for each of the three categories. For purposes of our analysis, we focus on the first risk group, political risks. In the construction of the political risk rating, 12 variables covering both political and social characteristics are measured. We use four of these variables, namely, government stability, corruption, democratic accountability and bureaucracy quality in our empirical analysis of the impact of governance and public spending on social outcomes.
Government Stability.
The highest possible rating on government stability is 12 points.
This is a measure of the ability of a government to carry out its declared programs and its ability to stay in office. The risk rating is the sum of three subcomponent scores, each with a maximum score of 4 points and a minimum score of 0 points. A higher score represents lower risks. The three subcomponents for the rating of government stability are government unity, legislative strength and popular support.
Corruption. The corruption variable could take a value that ranges from 0 to 6, with 6
representing the best control of corruption and 0 standing for the worst rating. This variable is a measure of corruption within the political system. The ICRG measure of corruption takes into account not only financial corruption in the form of special payments and bribes related to trade licenses, exchange controls, tax assessment, police protection or loans, but more focused on the type of corruption in the form of excessive patronage, nepotism, job reservations, secret party funding and suspiciously close ties between politics and business. A higher score for this variable stands for lower risks and better control of corruption in the political system.
Democratic Accountability. The possible value of this variable ranges from 0 to 6 with 6 indicating the best democratic accountability and the most responsive the government is to its people. This variable measures the extent to which the government responds to its citizens, based on the assumption that the less responsive it is, the more likely for the government to fail. The scores are assigned on the basis of the type of governance adopted by the country. The types of governance that are used to define this variable include alternating democracy, dominated democracy, de-facto one-party state and de jure one-party state and autarchy.
Bureaucracy Quality. The range of this variable is from 0 to 4. A higher value of this variable is assigned to countries where the bureaucracy has better capabilities to govern without abrupt changes in policy or interruption in government services. The institutional strength and quality of the bureaucracy is an important determinant of risks and may minimize revisions of policy when governments change. Higher bureaucracy quality is likely to be associated with more efficient management and allocation of resources and more effective delivery of public services.
Worldwide Governance Indicators
The Political stability and absence of violence: perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by violent means.
Government effectiveness: perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies.
Regulator quality: perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permits and promotes private sector development.
Rule of law: perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society and the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. Publicly available information about the budget documents is defined as the information that can be obtained by any and all members of the public through a request to the public authority issuing the documents. Thus it includes two types of information, one of which is available through a well-defined procedure that ensures simultaneous release of public documents to all interested parties. The other type of information is available only on request. The implicit assumption underlying this definition is that the performance on OBI of a given country is not affected by which method a government chooses to disseminate documents Letter grade "a" or "b" is used to describe good practice regarding the subject matter of the question. "c" or "d" corresponds to poor practices. An "a" response indicates that a standard is fully met. In order to aggregate the responses, a numeric score of 100 percent is awarded for "a", 67 percent for "b", 33 percent for "c" and 0 for "d". If the response is "e" not applicable, then the question is not counted as part of the aggregate. If only three options are given by the question, then "a" is assigned 100
Control of corruption
percent, "b" is graded as 0. "c" causes the question to be excluded in the aggregation.
A score of 81 to 100 percent indicates that the government provides extensive information to citizens on the budget process. 61 to 80 percent indicates that the government "provides significant information to citizens", country scores of 41 to 60
indicate that the government "provides some information to citizens" and scores of 21 to 40 percent indicate that the government "provides minimal information to citizens". Less transparent countries share similar characteristics such as geographic locations, income level, dependency on foreign aids and weak democratic institutions. In addition the survey finds that the lack of transparency undermines accountability and prevents participation by citizens.
The Open Budget Questionnaire is intended to offer an independent, non governmental view of the state of budget transparency. All researchers are nongovernmental organizations and share a common interest in promoting access to information during the budget process, strengthening the power of the legislature, and in the performance of Supreme Audit Institution. The IBP staff conduct an analysis after the questionnaires are completed and make an effort to ensure that the questions have been answered in a consistent manner. The feedbacks are also cross-checked with public information. Following this analysis and review the questionnaire is submitted to two anonymous peer reviewers who are required to be independent of both the government and the research organization. Peer reviewer feedbacks are examined by the IBP staff so that the comments are consistent with the study's methodology and help ensure the consistency of assumptions across countries in selecting answers.
